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Human Rights Without the Human Good? A Reply to Jiwei Ci 
Simon Hope, Philosophy, University of Stirling 
 
Bernard Williams, in his magisterial discussion of Ancient Greek attitudes to slavery, 
observes that  
[i]n many comparisons between the ancient and the modern world it is 
assumed that in the ancient world social roles were understood to be 
rooted in nature. Indeed, it is often thought to be a special mark of modern 
societies, distinguishing them from earlier ones, that they have lost this 
idea [...] A central feature of modern liberal conceptions of social justice 
can indeed be expressed by saying that they altogether deny the existence 
of necessary social identities.1 
Williams is undoubtably correct about this; as he is about the fact that the ‘intellectual 
machinery’ by which the point can be expressed is itself distinctly modern, and about 
the need to guard against making this contrast the sole lynchpin on which our 
understanding of distant social moralities hangs. Williams’s point makes it well worth 
asking: what has the history of liberal thought proposed to replace notions of 
necessary social identity with, and how do those proposals relate to other elements of 
modern liberalism? 
 
For Jiwei Ci, answers to these questions expose some crippling deficiencies in our 
thinking about human rights. Ci’s specific target is liberty rights, about which he 
advances two critical theses: 
1. ‘[l]iberty rights, no matter how justified, cannot be justified as human rights.’2 
2.  ‘liberty rights as understood in the standard way are too weak as liberal rights, 
and this is shown by a contradiction within the liberal approach to liberty 
rights in a liberal society.’3 
In the first half (roughly speaking) of this paper I shall argue that neither of these 
theses should be accepted. Nonetheless – and this forms my paper’s second half –
                                                        
1 Williams, Shame and Necessity, p. 126-127. 
 
2 Ci, “Liberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy” (this volume), p. 2. 
 
3 Ci, p. 6. 
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there may be serious tensions in the way that modern global justice theorists assemble 
the deliverances of the liberal tradition when vindicating human rights. These tensions 
centre on the liberal conception of the human good, and I shall suggest that we would 
do much better, when vindicating human rights, to draw on strands of liberalism 
which do not invoke any conception of the human good. 
 
I. Against Ci’s Two Theses 
 
I begin with Ci’s iconoclastic claim that liberty rights, as liberals standardly conceive 
of such rights, cannot be human rights. Ci’s reasoning is as follows: ‘because people 
in different times and places have led humanly meaningful and worthwhile lives 
without anything like liberty rights’, it is mistaken ‘to regard liberty rights as rights 
that human beings have simply by virtue of being human.’4 Rather, the standard 
liberal understanding of liberty rights denotes a set of freedoms associated with a 
particular way of being human, where human agency is fundamentally determined by 
liberal social forms. The mistake, Ci claims, occurs when global justice theorists treat 
the peculiarly liberal way of configuring human agency ‘as if it were human agency 
as such’. 
 
I find this argument deeply flawed. For one thing, it is too quick. Liberal global 
justice theorists will be unperturbed by Ci’s objection if they hold that the particular 
configuration of agency that liberty rights protect is the true or correct configuration 
of human agency. Thus, to give one example, Darrel Moellendorf defends an 
expansive account of human rights centred on the Rawlsian conception of the person, 
on the grounds that the Rawlsian conception of the person is true, and so ‘the fact that 
the conception of persons originates in the democratic tradition cannot be a reason not 
to apply it elsewhere.’5 Here, Moellendorf seems to take the liberal rejection of any 
necessary social identity as allowing the claim that the liberal (or rather, Rawls’s) 
conception of the person strikes bedrock.  
 
                                                        
4Ci, p. 1-2.  
 
5 Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, pp. 18-23; quote from p. 23. 
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I suspect Ci does not contemplate this counter-argument because he assumes we 
already have in view a bedrock understanding of common humanity that is not 
conclusively liberal. Ci employs the phrase ‘the human form of life’ repeatedly in his 
essay, and the Wittgensteinian resonance6 of that phrase suggests that a certain set of 
practices which could shape one’s life mark, when manifest, that life as non-
defectively human. Ci is at any rate committed to such a notion: his objection to 
seeing liberty rights as human rights depends on the assumption that the appropriate 
‘minimalist justification’ for human rights must appeal to what is involved in living ‘a 
human life’ or ‘humanly meaningful’ life.7 This sort of talk is common enough in the 
philosophical literature on human rights, but – like talk of the unnaturalness of 
nuclear power – complex philosophical commitments are necessary if the atypically 
narrow scope given to the classificatory term is to make sense. In judgments that 
some blighted lives are less than fully human the commitment in question must be 
that reflection on human nature reveals a singularly human form of life. While what 
Ci takes this form of life to involve is opaque, it seems to be characterised by ‘generic 
freedom’: roughly, that the shape of one’s life passes some test of individual and 
collective reflective endorsement, and lives that do not pass this test are not fully 
human. Generic freedom is not liberal freedom (the latter involves a distinctive 
conception of autonomy that the former lacks), and, armed with this understanding of 
the human form of life, Ci cannot entertain the notion that a distinctively liberal 
understanding of agency hits bedrock.  
 
Yet matters cannot be so straightforward. If ‘the human form of life’ is to be specified 
in sufficiently generic terms that the objection Ci presses against liberty rights as 
human rights does not apply to it, then the notion of ‘the human form of life’ ends up 
vacuously empty. Many societies certainly have forced some human beings into lives 
that do not pass, from the inside, the relevant test of reflective endorsement. But if Ci 
is to say, of slave-holding societies etc., that they are not human societies, then his 
notion of ‘the human form of life’ is in the relevant respects just as limited as the 
liberal understanding: it is associated with a particular set of historically and 
                                                        
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations I, §241; II, p. 226e. Compare Michael 
Thompson, Life and Action, p. 207-208. 
 
7 Ci, p. 3-4. 
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culturally contingent social practices, alternatives to which humans have found 
meaningful.8 
 
An even more urgent question concerns the coherence of the very idea of the human 
form of life. I do not think it plausible to speak of such a thing. The only way to see 
human behaviour in terms of the forces that animate it is to keep in view the 
remarkable diversity of human mores and conventions, social moralities, forms of 
life, and conceptions of ourselves; all the diverse patterns of conduct through which 
particular constellations of concepts, beliefs, and values are combined into rational 
experiences of the world. One must also keep in view the complex tides and eddies of 
thought created by individuals’ intellectual engagement with the particular 
constellations of concepts and beliefs they have inherited in particular times and 
places, so that any appropriately historical view of all this is a decidedly 
kaleidoscopic one. I hope the reader will excuse the mangled metaphors, but this is 
the clearest and most accurate way I know of to characterise what human nature and 
human reasoning is. And because all that anyone’s reflection, anywhere, has to go on 
is an ensemble of culturally inherited and historically contingent notions, it is not 
plausible to think that there is a distinctively human form of life characterised by the 
exercise of human reason. There are, in Clifford Geertz’s marvelous phrase, only ‘the 
forms human life has locally taken’.9 
 
None of this stops us reflecting on the features of the sort of creature that inhabits 
these diverse forms of life. Nor is there an obvious reason to rule out tying the 
justification for human rights to those elements of human beings which are morally 
significant enough to ground rights, rather than to a singularly human way (form) of 
life. What then matters is whether liberty rights protect those morally significant 
features of human beings, and the question of which forms of life liberty rights are 
                                                        
8 Compare Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, p. 66: ‘I find it quite hard 
to burden pre-dynastic Egyptians, 9th century French serfs, or early 20th century 
Yanomamö tribesmen with the view that they are acting correctly if their action is 
based on a norm on which there would be universal consensus in an ideal speech 
situation.’ Or, for that matter, on Ci’s understanding of generic freedom.  
 
9 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 16. See also Richard Schweder, Thinking 
Through Cultures; and Michael Jackson, Life Within Limits. 
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appropriate to becomes uninteresting: human beings have basic rights in virtue of the 
kind of creature a human being is, and these rights determine which forms of life are 
morally acceptable. 
 
Just how a liberal argument along the above lines might unfold is a very complex 
question. If we are to attribute weighty moral significance to some notion of what it is 
to be human, we must acknowledge that the contours of the concept “human being” 
we appeal to are shaped by more than the properties of the natural kind “human 
being” as a biologist might understand it. Any understanding of “human being” that 
could bear the required philosophical weight will be a deliverance of our second 
nature: of a particular shaping of our brute biological capacities for reason, speech, 
and sociability that one acquired in becoming habituated into a culturally and 
historically particular form of life.10 I am allowing my language to become 
McDowellian here to register the point that the sorts of notions of “human being” one 
must use to vindicate moral claims are themselves products of particular, historically 
contingent, social moralities. We should not readily assume that just because we all 
are human beings any rational convergence on the sort of understanding of our life-
form that could ground human rights is obvious or to be expected.11 As Geertz 
observes, 
the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgment, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other wholes and against its social and natural 
background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world’s cultures.12    
                                                        
10 John McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism”, in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and 
W. Quinn (ed.) Virtues and Reasons (pp. 149-179); compare Simon Hope, “Neo-
Aristotelian Justice: An Unsolved Question”, Res Publica 19:2, 2013, pp. 157-172. 
 
11 As, for example, Martha Nussbaum seems to: ‘We [meaning, apparently, all 
reasonable souls] can accept without profound metaphysics the idea that human life 
has a characteristic shape and form’. Frontiers of Justice p. 186; compare Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development p. 72-73. 
 
12 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 59. 
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This does not mean we cannot, in justifying human rights, appeal to such a 
conception. I think it does show that we would do very well to avoid blithe assertions 
of the truth of the liberal conception of our life-form, and to focus instead on the very 
hard question of how we might adduce considerations for seeing things our way that 
are accessible to others who see things differently.13  
 
Other difficulties also intrude. There is a complex question, which I shall not address 
here, over the work a conception of human life-form can do in our thinking about 
moral obligation.14 There is also a question, to which I will return, of the extent to 
which defenders of human rights slip between appeals to what a human being is and 
appeals to a ‘truly human’ form of life. But the point I wish to register here is that Ci’s 
claim that liberty rights cannot be human rights depends on the assumption that 
human rights are grounded in a distinctively human form of life. There is no reason 
for liberal defenders of human rights to accept that assumption; indeed, we should 
reject it. 
 
I turn now to Ci’s second critical claim: that the liberal understanding of liberty rights 
is too weak. Ci’s criticism is motivated by the belief that contemporary liberal 
thinkers ignore the extent to which their favoured conception of agency is determined 
by the institutions of global capitalism. What is missed is that the autonomy liberty 
rights protect is ‘autonomy under constraints imposed by the capitalist organisation of 
economic and social life [...] thus we must understand liberty rights as advancing the 
cause of human wellbeing within limits set by the capitalist order.15 This fact, Ci 
claims, cripples liberty rights as liberal rights, because the institutions of global 
capitalism fatally undermine autonomy. 
 
                                                        
13 This is a very controversial point, which I cannot adequately defend here, but 
nothing I go on to say depends upon this view of the task of moral philosophy. 
 
14 Compare G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 38 (in Collected 
Papers vol III), speaking of the sense in which the possession of certain 
capacities/virtues is the norm for mankind: ‘in this sense “norm” has ceased to be 
roughly equivalent to “law”’. See also the concerted attempt by Michael Thompson, 
Life and Action, to overcome Anscombe’s doubt. 
 
15 Ci, p 28. 
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Ci seeks to vindicate this criticism via a complex argument. Ci sensibly observes that 
autonomous agents can only determine themselves through inherited understandings 
they did not initially choose.16 But Ci goes on to describe certain liberal moral aims, 
such as individuals’ access to the various mechanisms within local forms of life 
through which changes in social practices may be effected, and the attainment of 
moral goods, as grounded in the need to ‘redeem’ autonomy from our unchosen 
second nature. This grounding I find much less obvious, both as a description of 
liberalism and as a sensible idea.17  
 
Ci offers two arguments to show that the social forms of modern capitalism are in 
direct conflict with these moral aims. The first is to observe that under market 
institutions ‘the weak are absolutely inferior to the strong in their ability to shape the 
social setting for individual autonomy’.18 Given that free market institutions offer no 
corrective for inequalities in bargaining power that individuals bring into the market, 
this is an accurate criticism of libertarian versions of liberalism that only acknowledge 
rights against interference. But there are plenty of alternative liberal conceptions of 
liberty rights where liberty rights and welfare rights must be taken together,19 and Ci’s 
point does not show that those conceptions are too weak. 
 
Ci’s second argument is more ambitious. As Ci puts it, ‘the exercise of individual 
autonomy, a precious and indispensable value in any modern form of human life, is 
warped, compromised, and even undermined when it is framed by a social setting 
                                                        
16 Ci, p. 9. 
 
17 I struggle to see how ‘redemption’ is at all a plausible idea. That individuals only 
acquire the capacities for interaction under any complex social forms in virtue of 
having been habituated into an historically and culturally particular form of life is 
simply a part of our finitude. Saying that this fact requires redemption betrays a 
dubious wishful thinking, identifying human finitude as a source of regret for human 
beings. I cannot see why we should take such a thought seriously: it is akin to genuine 
regret that one lacks x-ray vision or the ability to freeze time.  
 
18 Ci, p. 8. 
 
19 For example: Henry Shue, Basic Rights, p. 31; Liz Ashford, “The Alleged 
Dichotomy Between Positive Rights and Negative Duties”, in C. Beitz and R. Goodin 
(ed.) Global Basic Rights, pp. 94-100. 
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increasingly dominated by (global) capital [...] shaped in such a way as to make 
choosing and pursuing the good life an increasingly uphill struggle.’20 Here, the 
argument is that the liberal conception of liberty rights is consistent with social forms 
that undermine our attainment of ethical goods. Ci develops the argument via a 
detailed meditation on Alasdair MacIntyre’s jeremiad on the atomising, hollow nature 
of modern liberal social forms – a social world fit for aesthetes, managers, and 
therapists but one entirely unsuited to the attainment of meaningful virtues and lives21 
– and the related sociological work of Richard Sennett. The lesson Ci draws is that the 
liberal conception of liberty rights ‘makes for a regime of self-constitution in which 
people acquire what is most important for themselves (individual identities) through 
efforts directed at the most unsuitable objects (external goods) and in the least 
auspicious manner (sheer competitiveness).’22 
 
Social forces promoting success in terms of ultimately meaningless baubles achieved 
at the expense of one’s fellows are undoubtably at work in liberal societies, but the 
connection to liberty rights may not be immediately apparent. As Brian Barry once 
remarked, a properly liberal society ‘provides alcohol, tranquilizers, wrestling on the 
television, astrology, psychoanalysis, and so on, endlessly’ for those who do not wish 
to take the opportunity liberty rights provide for taking responsibility and control over 
their own lives.23 But for Barry, nothing about the basic structure of liberal society 
entails, rather than merely makes possible, the dominance of the hollow, atomised, 
and morally debased lives MacIntyre and Ci lament. Why, then, does Ci think liberty 
rights are too weak when conceived of as liberal rights, rather than holding that not all 
individuals may prove strong enough to make the most of their liberty?  
 
Ci’s answer, if I understand him, is that one cannot isolate the liberal conception of 
liberty rights from the atomising social forces in modern liberal societies. ‘This liberal 
moral vision’ Ci writes, ‘has as its outer limits a comprehensive ordering of human 
                                                        
20 Ci, p. 11, p. 13. 
 
21 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed).  
 
22 Ci, p. 15-16.  
 
23 Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, p. 127. 
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life in which prominently figures the capitalist organization of production and 
consumption’.24 Ci’s appeal to the close historical connection between liberalism and 
capitalism is what makes his essay so interesting and potentially powerful. But I do 
not think the MacIntyrean jeremiad is at all helpful in making sense of how, if at all, 
the close historical connection between liberalism and capitalism renders liberal 
conceptions of liberty rights problematic. 
 
For one thing, there is something unfortunate about the one-sided MacIntyrean 
contrast between the hollow, atomised, and morally debased liberal form of life and 
some rich, interconnected, non-liberal alternative in which lives have meaningful 
narratives. The non-liberal alternative in such comparisons is invariably presented in a 
remarkably idealised fashion, applying notions of “community” or “narrative 
structure” solely to favoured instances of such. ‘It is’, Stephen Holmes has 
penetratingly remarked, ‘as if “the dental” referred exclusively to healthy teeth’.25 In 
this light, Ci’s own avowedly utopian vision of a post-liberal alternative can scarcely 
be encouraging. 
 
One also wishes for a more nuanced picture of liberal social forms. Consider, for 
example, Ajume Wingo’s comparison between Ghanaian life and the life of one of his 
American students: 
A responsive government makes it possible for persons to lead isolated, 
even eccentric, lifestyles. While in communalistic parts of Ghana it takes 
a village to raise a child, in my student’s hometown, it takes a daycare 
centre. Whereas one can fish, hunt, and farm at Whole Foods for far more 
food than is needed to survive, in rural Ghana, one must trek long 
distances in order to literally fish, hunt, and farm. Whereas extended 
family is central to the survival of the individual in Ghana, in my 
student’s homeland, an extended family can be ignored without peril. For 
him, and Americans more generally, value is measured in dollars. But for 
an average African who lives with (or perhaps in spite of) her non-
                                                        
24 Ci, p. 27. 
 
25 Stephen Holmes, “The Permanent Structure of Anti-Liberal Thought” (in N. 
Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life), p. 232. 
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responsive, dysfunctional government, a familial network is a far surer 
measure of wealth, guarantor of survival, and protector of freedom than is 
a government-issued currency.26 
Ghanian life as Wingo describes it is much less atomised, and this has advantages: 
Wingo observes that something like the Kitty Genovese tragedy would be extremely 
unlikely in a Ghanian community. But Wingo is also sensitive to the fact that 
atomised modes of life can only arise under stable, effective, generally responsive – 
although by no means perfectly just – social institutions. Seen in this light, there is 
considerable force to Judith Shklar’s observation that any hankering for more 
extensive communal or individual identities is the luxury of a privileged liberal 
society.27   
 
The one-sidedness of the MacIntyrean jeremiad Ci deploys also obscures the fact that 
there is more room for thinking through the connections between liberalism and 
capitalism than Ci allows. At this point, it becomes necessary to pin down precisely 
what I take “liberalism” to be. “Liberalism” is a contested notion, with various 
restrictive definitions stipulated for specific purposes: thus Philip Pettit (for the 
purpose of too-sharply separating liberalism from republicanism) treats liberalism as a 
19th century invention; thus Sam Freeman (for purposes unclear to me) seeks to 
distance libertarian views from the liberal tradition.28 These are just two examples 
among many, but if one is to get a proper grip on liberalism a broader characterisation 
is needed. The following seems accurate to me: to borrow a phrase from John Pocock, 
liberalism is fundamentally concerned with the ‘separation and recombination’ of 
individual liberty and political authority,29 and it holds that the appropriate separation 
                                                        
26 Ajume Wingo, “The Odyssey of Human Rights”, Transition 102:1, 2010, pp. 120-
138; quote from p. 121. Compare Michael Jackson, Life Within Limits. 
 
27 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”, in N. Rosenblum (ed.) Liberalism and the 
Moral Life, p. 35-36. 
 
28 Philip Pettit, “Liberalism and Republicanism”, Australian Journal of Political 
Science 28:4, 1993, p. 163; Philip Pettit, Republicanism, p. 8; Samuel Freeman, 
“Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 30:2, 2001, pp. 105-151. 
  
29 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, p. 44. 
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and recombination must be justifiable to all citizens as individuals. I think it is also 
fair to say that capitalist thinking is entwined with liberalism from the very outset: the 
17th century originators of liberalism saw inviolable property rights as the best way of 
achieving and securing the correct separation and recombination of liberty and 
authority.30 By the 18th century the nascent institutions of global commerce quickly 
came to be seen as the best means of subjugating both mankind’s anti-social interests 
and the political pursuit of glory, thereby ensuring a world in which the liberal 
separation and recombination was stable.31 
 
Grasping the initial links between liberalism and capitalism enables us to reject Ci’s 
claim that liberals effectively lack the philosophical materials to think of human 
nature in terms other than unencumbered, atomised, self-interest.32 The early liberals 
embraced a much richer and more plausible conception of human nature, and it was 
precisely a concern with the darker human tendencies that linked liberalism and 
capitalism. As Albert Hirschman notes, 
capitalism was precisely expected and supposed to repress certain human 
drives and proclivities and to fashion a less multifaceted, less 
unpredictable, and more “one-dimensional” human personality. This 
position, which seems so strange today, arose from extreme anguish over 
the clear and present dangers of a certain historical period, from concern 
over the destructive forces unleashed by the human passions with the only 
exception, so it seemed at the time, of “innocuous” avarice.33 
The idea that human nature is accurately described in terms of unencumbered egoism 
is one contingent possibility within liberal thought, and it rose in influence only by 
                                                        
30 Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, Part I; Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and 
Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, chapters 1-3. 
 
31 Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests; see also Istvan Hont, “Free 
Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics”, in Dunn (ed.) The Economic 
Limits of Modern Politics.  
 
32 Ci, p. 26, formulates the point as follows: while certain modern liberals do not 
outrightly endorse atomised self-interest, the fundamentally capitalist nature of the 
liberal moral vision excludes the real possibility of an alternative. See also MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, p. 34. 
 
33 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, p. 132. 
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exploiting the use – by earlier liberal arguments for capitalism – of the term “interest” 
to denote innocuous passions, in such a way as to break with those arguments’ richer 
conceptions of human nature. To the earlier liberal writers, the idea that commerce 
harnessed the deepest human drives in a way that naturally transformed (via invisible 
hands, and so on) discord into concord was seen as wishful thinking based on a 
misguidedly narrow understanding of human nature. The context in which the early 
liberals thought of human nature is one in which a belief in the universality of human 
nature was increasingly thought to be feasible only if narrowly reductive accounts of 
human nature were avoided,34 and by the end of the 18th century some thinkers were 
convinced that diversity was so great that commercial interaction offered the only 
hope of understanding other cultures.35 The point here is that whatever is lost to us 
from 18th century accounts of human nature, the rejection of simplisticly reductive 
accounts is still an option for us, and it has always been a part of the liberal tradition’s 
materials for thinking through connections with capitalism. 
 
A similar point can be made with respect to virtue and character, which both 
MacIntyre and Ci assert are eroded by capitalism. Early liberals were profoundly 
concerned that the separation and recombination of liberty and authority must be 
institutionally protected: they came to see that conceiving of good government and 
society through the mode of civic virtue was inadequate. Such a mode appeared to 
them not only to be unable to address the institutional complexities of liberty, but also 
to hopelessly idealise away aspects of our nature.36 But the liberal ambivalence 
towards civic virtue does not necessitate a blindness to character. Whereas older 
traditions of thinking through the virtues located character within a religious or 
natural scheme that specified the variety of roles through which man’s social nature 
                                                        
34 For an excellent account of this context see Aaron Garrett, “Human Nature”, in 
Knud Haakonssen (ed.) The Cambridge History of 18th Century Philosophy, vol I, pp. 
160-233. 
 
35 See Anthony Pagden, European Encounters With the New World, chapter 5. 
 
36 See Steve Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism”, 
American Historical Review June 1998, pp. 705-736 at pp. 729-732. Pincus deals with 
the 17th century English context, and see Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists 
Were For, pp. 71-73, for the 18th century American context. 
 
 14 
was understood,37 the liberal rejection of any necessary social identity made appeal to 
such schemes unavailable. In its place, a distinctively liberal strand of thinking about 
character attempted to make do with the imperfect elements of human nature as such, 
playing humanity’s negative tendencies off one another in order to negate their 
effects.38 
 
The initial intertwining of liberal and capitalist thought emerges as part of the solution 
to the problem of man’s inhumanity to man; a problem which is very much still with 
us, although of course not to be understood now in quite the same way it was then. 
The early liberals’ solution had to render stable the liberal separation and 
recombination of individual liberty and political authority, and at that point the 
nascent institutions of capitalism become instrumentally implicated in the solution. In 
light of all this, Ci’s complaint that liberty rights are too weak as liberal rights must 
appear implausible. This is not to say that the tendencies of modern life that so 
concern MacIntyre and Ci are entirely untroubling. What I am trying to say is that 
even if those concerns are a problem created by the liberal vision of liberty rights, 
those concerns cannot show that the liberal conception of liberty rights is too weak. If 
I am right there is a venerable, and clearly liberal, way of conceiving of liberty rights 
that does not attempt to do any more than secure the basic institutional conditions for 
the legitimate use of political authority. Ci has not shown that liberty rights, as 
standardly conceived, are too weak for that task. 
 
II. The Liberal Good Life and the Institutions of Global Capitalism 
 
So we ought to reject both of Ci’s theses about liberty rights. Yet there is more to be 
said about human rights generally, for there is more than one way of pressing the 
objection that, in Katrin Flikschuh’s words, ‘the currently evolving liberal morality 
may be labouring under its own historically engendered economic and political 
                                                        
37 Think, for example, of the efforts the Roman of good character would go to in order 
to display proper masculinity, moderating their gait and vocal resonance: see Peter 
Brown, The Body and Society, pp. 9-12. Greek attitudes are not much different in 
these respects: Williams, Shame and Necessity, pp. 117-123; Julia Annas, “Plato’s 
Republic and Feminism”, Philosophy 51, issue 197, pp. 307-321. 
 
38 Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices. See also Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. 
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constraints’ in a way that undermines certain liberal accounts of human rights.39 
Flikschuh herself, in pressing this objection, differs from Ci on at least two points. 
First, whereas Ci focuses on the attainment of ethical goods within liberal societies, 
Flikschuh focuses on whether liberalism can achieve globally the political and 
economic aspirations that it holds to be universally valid. The worry, which Flikschuh 
advances only tentatively, is that societies may only secure liberal moral 
commitments domestically via political and economic institutions that  
sustain inequalities at the global level; inequalities which necessarily undermine 
liberalism’s universal commitments.40 But – and this is the second important 
difference between Flikschuh and Ci – Flikschuh is careful not to portray the issue in 
broadly Marxist terms as a contradiction inherent in the very idea of liberalism. 
Everything depends on how liberals understand the universal commitments captured 
by justice and human rights, and only some strands of liberal thought are open to the 
charge that the standards of universal justice they promulgate are intermeshed with 
inequalities at the global level that prevent the realisation of those standards for all. 
 
Making sense of Flikschuh’s point calls for a second excursion into the history of 
liberalism. Flikschuh emphasises two distinct strands of liberal thought. One – older, 
reaching back to liberalism’s 17th century origins – is deontological, understanding 
the demands of universal morality as a set of constraints on permissible ways of going 
on. The second strand – venerable but more recent, originating in utilitarian thinking – 
is fundamentally teleological in outlook, deriving the demands of universal morality 
from an account of the good human life. For Flikschuh, the problem liberal global 
justice theorists face lies in the influence in contemporary thinking of this second 
strand. Whereas the older, deontological, strand of liberalism was fundamentally 
oriented around questions of political legitimacy, ‘liberalism’s teleological strand [...] 
took questions of political legitimacy as settled and considered the question of 
individual wellbeing entirely from within the institutional and conceptual framework 
of the individual state’. And precisely because the earlier questions of legitimacy had 
been settled in ways that vindicated the nascent capitalist international order, the 
                                                        
39 Katrin Flikschuh, “The Limits of Liberal Cosmopolitanism”, Res Publica, 2004, p. 
190. 
 
40 Flikschuh, p. 186. 
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liberal good life ‘presupposes the presence of a competitive free market economy as 
well as a strong conception of liberal sovereign statehood that deploys political power 
with an eye to achieving maximal economic advantage’.41 
 
The deontological strand was certainly not eclipsed by the later teleological strand;42 
the two persist contemporaneously, as two contingent paths via which liberal thought 
develops and adapts, and liberal theorists assemble the deliverances of either or both 
strands in a wide variety of ways. This point may make the historical argument 
Flikschuh offers appear entirely unconvincing: that a strand of liberal thought 
developed in a certain way hardly implies that liberal thinking has to stay that way, 
and the teleological strand of liberal thought certainly does not lack the philosophical 
resources to give an account of political legitimacy rather than simply taking the issue 
as settled. Yet I think Flikschuh’s point can be both strengthened and deepened, in a 
way that exposes this rebuttal as too simplistic, by further reflection on what the 
conception of the good that forms the liberal telos requires of an institutional scheme. 
  
Any plausibly liberal conception of the good life will reflect the abiding concern of 
liberal thought with the separation and recombination of individual liberty and 
political authority. For this reason, the liberal good life is the life of personal 
autonomy: the liberal conception of flourishing is one where the shape of one’s own 
life is, to a significant degree, under one’s control. In Stephen Wall’s words: 
Personal autonomy is the ideal of people charting their own course 
through life, fashioning their character by self-consciously choosing 
projects and taking up commitments from a wide range of eligible 
                                                        
41 Flikschuh, p. 189. 
 
42 To give one example of the deontological strand’s persistence, although there is a 
common tendency now to think that liberalism has always opposed to slavery as a 
monstrous enemy of human flourishing and dignity, one of the most powerful 19th 
century anti-slavery arguments – Abraham Lincoln’s, among many others – made no 
such appeal to flourishing, and decried slavery solely in (libertarian) terms of the evil 
of denying a man the fruit of his own labour. See Garry Wills, “Lincoln’s Black 
History”, NYRB LVI:10, 2009, pp. 52-55. That is a recognisably liberal argument, 
even if not everyone (including Lincoln) who made it held uniformly liberal views on 
race. 
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alternatives, and making something out of their lives according to their 
own understanding of what is valuable and worth doing.43 
All of this will be very familiar to any reader of contemporary political philosophy, 
and I shall not dwell on the details of differing philosophical accounts. What I want to 
emphasise is that significant, or at least sufficient, control over the shape of one’s life, 
as it is understood in liberal conceptions of the good life, is a complex matter 
requiring social institutions to secure for individuals a considerable array of 
capabilities.  
 
To see this it is necessary to interrogate further what it is to ‘make’,44 or ‘shape’,45 or 
chart the course of, one’s own life. It is consistently held to involve an array of 
meaningful options, although the width of that array is often left unclear.46 Yet it 
should be possible to say more. According to Martha Nussbaum, to live a sufficiently 
autonomous life requires (among other things) that one attains a decent basic level of 
education; exercising one’s creative choice according to one’s own lights; control 
over one’s body and the ability to form mutually consensual sexual relationships 
according to one’s tastes and orientation; an informed view of the world and politics 
that one has been able to assemble oneself in the market-place of ideas; freedom of 
movement; the ability to form personal attachments with others and to engage in the 
pursuits through which those attachments play out; the secure ownership of property; 
a significant degree of social and workplace mobility; and the economic, political, 
legal, and physical resources to be able to do all these things without sacrificing or 
rendering insecure (to an objectionable degree) any basic needs.47 My punctuation is 
here intended to convey the breathlessness one may be left with when confronted by 
Nussbaum’s list. Yet it is difficult to see how someone could have sufficiently 
authored/made their life if control with respect to one of Nussbaum’s items is denied 
                                                        
43 Stephen Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, p. 203. 
   
44 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 375. 
 
45 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 72. 
  
46 Raz, Morality of Freedom, p. 204; Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 4-5; Wall, 
Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, p. 188-189. 
 
47 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, p. 77-78. 
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them (their sexual relations; their possessions; etc.). Something fundamentally similar 
to this list must, then, be entailed by the liberal conception of the good life as a life 
that is, to the requisite degree, “made”, “shaped”, “authored”, or “charted” by oneself.  
 
Anything close, if not identical, to Nussbaum’s list will require a very complex 
constellation of capabilities involving a considerable array of options in a very wide 
number of spheres of life. These options are not of course limitless – Nozick’s 
remark48 about being able to leave my knife where I like, but not in your chest applies 
to all this too – but they must be considerable. Defenders of the liberal good life 
typically take this to be a strength of their conception of the human good: it is not a 
culturally specific conception, and can be lived within a wide variety of local forms of 
life.49 I am not so sure. What this conception of the good life involves is the option to 
pursue whichever cultural values one chooses to under one’s own terms within the 
context of a basic structure of institutions that secure the long list of capabilities and 
options that the good life requires.  
 
In fact, very few sorts of institutional structure will be able to secure the constellation 
of capabilities and options that constitute the conditions for the liberal good life. It is 
very hard to see how the requisite institutional structure could be anything other than 
fundamentally market-based, both because of the range of options required, and 
because a considerable degree of freedom not only to expend but also to generate 
one’s wealth seems a fundamental part of this constellation of capabilities and 
options. This is not to say that what is required is the completely unfettered market 
that libertarians dream of.50 What it is to say is that the conditions for the attainment 
of the liberal good life seem perfectly suited to, and so far as anyone has managed 
seem only achievable under, the socioeconomic institutions of global market 
capitalism, constrained by – but also, importantly, constraining in turn – the domestic 
                                                        
48 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 171. 
 
49 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, p. 296-297; Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 
24. 
 
50 Compare Joseph Heath, “Liberal Autonomy and Consumer Sovereignty”, pp. 204-
225 of John Christman and Joel Anderson (ed.) Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism. 
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forms of liberal democracy. Given that the prosperity that enables liberal societies to 
secure (should they choose to) the liberal good life for all their members has only 
been furnished by global socioeconomic institutions that systematically deny that 
prosperity to others elsewhere,51 I find the following disquieting suggestion entirely 
plausible: the liberal good life is not one that can be universally attained. It cannot be, 
because the institutional structures that create the conditions for the attainment of the 
good life within liberal societies are inextricably intertwined with systemic economic 
inequalities at the global level that prevent all from attaining it.  
 
At this point I would like to bring back into view the question of what liberal thought 
replaces the notion of necessary social identities with. John Tasioulas has recently 
insisted that to uncover a philosophically robust conception of human rights one must 
focus on ‘the human good and the special protection it merits’.52 Many, many liberal 
defenders of human rights follow this route of argument. In doing so, they locate a 
conception of common humanity devoid of any necessary social roles or stratification 
by defining it through an account of (what is taken to be) a truly human life. And that 
conception of the good life has to be the liberal life marked by autonomy. Here is a 
reliably representative (if unusually explicit concerning the slip between human being 
and human life) example: 
the core idea is that of the human being as a dignified and free being who 
shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, 
rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the 
manner of a “flock” or “herd” animal. A life that is really human is shaped 
throughout by [the] twin human powers of practical reason and 
sociability.53 
Insofar as defenders of human rights follow this line, it is hard to see how their 
conception of human rights avoids the contradiction of setting universal entitlements 
                                                        
51 See, for example, the compelling condemnation of global institutions in Pogge, 
World Poverty and Human Rights. 
  
52 John Tasioulas, “The Moral Reality of Human Rights”, p. 100. 
 
53 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 72. Compare Jim Griffin’s 
understanding of common humanity through shared prudential judgments about 
wellbeing: Griffin, On Human Rights, pp. 113-125. 
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for all that are intermeshed with global economic institutions that prevent the 
universal fulfilment of those entitlements.  
 
In reply, defenders of human rights within liberalism’s teleological strand might argue 
that while the content of human rights must be grounded in the liberal conception of 
human flourishing, the derivation could fall well short of the array of capabilities and 
options that are intermeshed with capitalist socioeconomic forms. Thus Thomas 
Pogge has insisted that human rights be understood ‘largely in terms of the unspecific 
means to, rather than components of, human flourishing’, and Pogge is careful to 
select a narrow list of means that fall far short of the complex constellation of 
capabilities and options one would need to sufficiently shape or author one’s life.54 Or 
one might hold that connecting the liberal good life to human rights itself introduces a 
deontological constraint: the very idea of human rights as held by all human beings 
entails that the conception of the human good that gives such rights content is one 
simultaneously achievable by all human beings.55  
 
But the coherence of either sort of rebuttal is far from clear. As Thomas Hurka 
correctly observes, if we think that the criteria of justice are fundamentally concerned 
with the human good, then we cannot ‘first select principles of right and then just slot 
an account of the good into them, as if the latter made no difference to the former. 
The good does matter to the right: structural principles that might be plausible given 
one account of value may not be plausible given another.’56 Hurka’s point should be 
very well taken: if human rights matter because they protect the human good, it is not 
at all clear how such rights can justifiably fall short of entailing the institutional 
structures through which that good is to be achieved.57 
 
To be clear, the conclusion I have been arguing for in this section is just that the close 
connection between liberalism and capitalism only creates a contradiction when 
                                                        
54 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 42. 
 
55 Nussbaum seems to follow this line at Frontiers of Justice, p. 285-286. 
 
56 Thomas Hurka, “Capability, Functioning, and Perfectionism”, Aperion, p. 161. 
 
57 Although see Cruft, this volume, for a fascinating account of the complexities here. 
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human rights are defined and justified through the teleological strand of liberal 
thinking. Liberal thought, understood in broader terms, contains the intellectual 
machinery to support an array of acute and persuasive criticisms of the unjust effects 
of the institutions of global capitalism. But if liberals are to offer such criticisms, it is 
by no means clear that they can coherently do so by appealing to the liberal 
conception of the human good. And they would be well-advised not to do so. The 
familiar slip in liberal accounts of the good from “human being” to “human life” 
exposes such accounts to the same objection I pressed against Ci earlier: it is not 
plausible to speak of the distinctively human form of life. A robust defence of human 
rights would do much better to draw on the resources of other strands of the liberal 
tradition.  
 
This point can, however, be very hard to see because of the striking dominance of the 
teleological strand in liberal political philosophy in the era of human rights. Should 
anyone wish to dispute this remark by pointing out that the single most influential 
liberal thinker of our current period, John Rawls, consistently defended the idea that 
criteria of justice could be detached from any conception of the human good, I would 
make two related observations. The first is that if one looks at the initial reception of 
A Theory of Justice, even very sympathetic reviewers – Tom Nagel, Brian Barry 
among them – insisted that what was missing from Rawls’s account was a conception 
of the good.58 Here one catches a glimpse of the orthodoxy of the teleological strand. 
The second observation is that while a number of liberals (including Nagel and Barry) 
came around to Rawls’s view, the notion that one cannot talk of the basic rights and 
duties of justice in isolation from considerations of the human good is still so central 
to contemporary liberal theorising that there is an unfortunately common tendency to 
assume that the only way one can try to detach criteria of justice from a conception of 
the good is to be a Rawlsian ‘political liberal’.59 That many global justice theorists do 
indeed echo Tasioulas’s claim that the human good grounds human rights is a 
                                                        
58 Thomas Nagel, “Rawls’s Theory of Justice”, Philosophical Review 82:2, 1973, pp. 
220-234; Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, esp. p. 126-127. 
  
59 A typical example: Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, p. 16. One 
wonders what Quong, who is particularly sure of this assumption, would make of 
Kant’s political philosophy – would he really claim Kant was a ‘political liberal’?   
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manifestation of the dominance of the teleological strand. So, too, is Ci’s own 
erroneous equation of the very idea of liberalism with a conception of the human 
good.  
 
One thing all this has obscured is a very different deontological strand of liberal 
thinking, which eschews any of the cumbersome Rawlsian apparatus of ‘political’ 
liberalism. I know of no better description of this strand of liberalism than the words 
of the late Tony Judt:  
Liberalism [...] is necessarily indeterminate. It is not about some sort of 
liberal project for society; it is about a society in which the messiness and 
openness of politics precludes the application of large-scale projects, 
however rational and ideal – especially, indeed, if they are rational and 
ideal.60  
Although obscured, this strand of liberal thinking is not lost: it has modern defenders 
with cosmopolitan vision in the likes of, for example, Judith Shklar, Bernard 
Williams, and Onora O’Neill.61 I shall not here try to trace out all its main features or 
the divergences among its adherents. Suffice to say that this liberalism is 
indeterminate, insofar as it is, in virtue of the fact that it understands social moralities 
not as artifacts of academic contemplation, but as constellations of reason-giving 
concepts embodied in the mores and conventions of historically and culturally 
contingent forms of life. Accordingly, reasoning about what social justice requires is 
to be understood from the point of view of historically located individuals.62 It is 
argued that inclusive reasoning among a diverse domain of agents must necessarily 
focus on the principles such a domain cannot adopt; criteria of social justice are then 
embodied in a set of constraints against acting on such principles, and questions of 
telos or human good left entirely indeterminate.  
                                                        
60 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect, p. 315. 
 
61 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear”; Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the 
Deed; Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue. 
 
62 Compare O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue chapter 2 (especially p. 58: 
‘Reasoning is defective when reasoners misjudge or misrepresent what others can 
follow’), with Bernard Williams, “Saint-Just’s Illusion”, Making Sense of Humanity. 
See also O’Neill, Faces of Hunger, p. 32; Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed, p. 
50-51. 
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The key point I wish to register is that this strand of liberalism, in rejecting the notion 
of any necessary social identity, puts in its place a conception of human nature 
understood in terms of the finitude of vulnerable, interdependent beings. It does not 
equate this conception with a distinctively or ‘truly’ human form of life. Rather, it 
seeks to identify features of human finitude that the mores and conventions of any 
local form of life must register. The moral significance of these aspects of human 
finitude is not assumed to be intuitive to bearers of all diverse local forms of life;63 
nor need it even be claimed that there are any intrinsically valuable properties of 
human beings.64 Instead, the fact that social moralities are embedded in lived 
conventions that must register the nature of our finitude is taken to render accessible, 
to the bearers of diverse forms of life, the justification for institutions which 
systematically limit vulnerability and foreclose possibilities for exploitation. 
 
To spell all this out in a philosophically robust way would require far more room than 
I have here. All I can hope to make clear is the mere suggestion that this substrand of 
deontological liberalism offers something potentially very useful to our thinking 
about human rights. What it offers is a way of grounding the basic obligations 
mankind owes to all mankind in a conception of common humanity opposed to any 
necessary social identity which does not slip into implausible talk of the human form 
of life, and does not implicate the problematic liberal conception of the good. To my 
mind, this deontological substrand therefore represents a much more promising strand 
of liberalism to work with when thinking through the relationship between human 
rights and the socioeconomic institutions of global capitalism. It may well be that 
adopting this deontological substrand involves philosophical costs regarding the 
standard understanding of human rights: it is doubtless much easier to vindicate 
welfare rights by appeal to the human good than it is within the indeterminate 
                                                        
63 This is certainly true of O’Neill and Williams; Shklar may be more optimistic: see 
“The Liberalism of Fear”, p. 30. 
 
64 This is especially true of a certain Kantian line: see, for the complexities, Oliver 
Sensen, “Dignity and the Formula of Humanity (ad IV 429, IV 435)”, in Jens 
Timmermann (ed.) Kant’s ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’: A Critical 
Guide (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 102-118). Compare 
O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp. 91-97. 
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liberalism I am putting forward as an alternative. But exactly how duties concerning 
others welfare might feature within such an approach is a debate for another day.65 
 
I want to conclude by returning to where I began: my title. My title asks a question: 
human rights without the human good? I have not tried to answer that question here, 
only to raise it. Ci is correct to ask defenders of human rights to reflect more carefully 
than many have done on the interconnections between liberalism and capitalist 
institutions, and if what I have said is plausible such reflection should undermine the 
plausibility of grounding human rights in the liberal conception of the human good. 
But – although it is hard to see at times in the current literature – the broad liberal 
tradition leaves open many paths for conceiving of human rights without appeal to the 
human good, and it is well worth investigating whether human rights would 
ultimately be better served by attending to such paths. 
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